SHOULD COST MATTER when it comes
to deciding who goes to prison and for how long?
The process and results of sentencing reform in most states suggest that, until recently, the standard answer to this question has been no.
During the 1980s and 1990s, economically costly measures such as stiff mandatory minimum sentences, three-strikes legislation, and truth-insentencing laws were planted or took root. Critics of the reforms argued that spendthrift lawmakers driven by political gain and fear of appearing "soft" ignored the fiscal ramifications of new policy.
Tough-on-crime advocates asserted that no price was too high for initiatives that would protect public safety. There is little debate about who won the argument: during the last two decades of the twentieth century, America's incarcerated population grew more than 281 percent, finally approach- 
Is the Budget Crisis Changing the Way We Look at
Sentencing and Incarceration?, the third in an ongoing series of Issues in Brief, was created by SSC to show criminal justice decision makers how they can gain better control of fiscal and correctional resources by building rational and predictable policymaking systems through innovations like those in Kansas, North Carolina, and Virginia. Because many of our associates are involved in these and other cutting-edge reforms, they present an invaluable resource for jurisdictions contemplating or undertaking similar changes in their sentencing and corrections policies.
To learn more about SSC's work, or how the program can assist reform in your jurisdiction, visit our web site at www.vera.org/ssc or contact the program at (212) 376-3073 or dwilhelm@vera.org. 
S T A T E S E N T E N C I N G A N D C O R R E C T I O N S P R O G R A M

Shifting Public Attitudes. Crime is down and has been for the better part of a decade. 7 This decline is reflected in both violent crimes and property crimes. 
State Sentencing and Corrections Program Associates
The In 1994, Virginia enacted its fiscal note provision as part of a comprehensive reform to reserve prison beds for violent and repeat offenders. Violent offenders now serve from 100 to 600 percent more time in prison than they did before the reform was enacted. Since then, the state's crime rate has dropped 26 percent (compared to 24 percent nationally) while the incarceration rate has remained relatively stable, posting a 6 percent increase overall (versus 22 percent nationally). Fiscal notes, along with sentencing risk assessments and other resource management tools, have focused the attention of judges and legislators on discerning which offenders should be appropriately sanctioned outside of prison.
The chart above represents the percentage change in Virginia's crime and incarceration rates between 1990 and 2000. The rates from 1990 serve as a baseline. The value for each subsequent year represents a percentage of the 1990 rate. For example, in 2000, the crime rate was 68 percent of the 1990 crime rate and the incarceration rate was 150 percent of the 1990 rate. The vertical line marks the implementation of the 1994 reforms.
The chart shows that Virginia managed to increase sentences for violent offenders without incurring the cost of a ballooning incarceration rate. Most of the growth in the incarceration rate occurred before the 1994 reforms. 
Conclusion
The 
